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Arcella v. Arcella, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 104 (Dec. 26, 2017)1 
 
CHILD CUSTODY: CHILD’S EDUCATIONAL PLACEMENT 
 
Summary  
 
 The Court determined that district court’s focus—in a child custody case regarding 
educational placement—must remain on the child’s best interest and not on the religious objections 
made by a parent.  Specifically, the Court found that the district court abused its discretion by (1) 
treating one parent’s religious objection as dispositive; (2) failing to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing; and (3) failing to support its order with specific, factual findings. 
 
Background 
 
 In 2009, Melissa and Matthew Arcella divorced and agreed to joint legal and physical 
custody of their two children: at the time, four-year-old R.A. and two-year-old W.A.  As part of 
the divorce decree, the parents agreed to equally split the cost of the tuition for private school if 
they both agreed to send their children to private school. The parents mutually agreed to enroll 
their children into The Henderson International School, a small private, secular school.  Five years 
later, the parents agreed in a stipulated order that the children would continue attending the private 
school, but that Matthew would pay for all tuition costs. 
 In 2016, R.A. was 11-years old and about to finish elementary school, the parents agreed 
that R.A. should attend a larger middle school instead of going to Henderson’s middle school.  
However, the parents disagreed as to which middle school R.A. should attend. 
 Matthew petitioned the district court, requesting that an order stating that R.A. would 
attend Faith Lutheran, a religious private school.  Matthew argued that it was in R.A.’s best interest 
because she was accustomed to private schooling, R.A. wanted to go there, and it had a high 
college placement rate.  Melissa objected to R.A. receiving a religious education at Faith Lutheran.  
Melissa argued that R.A. should attend Bob Miller Middle School, the local public school, because 
it was highly ranked in academics and closer to the child’s primary residence. 
 The district court ordered—without an evidentiary hearing— that R.A. would attend Bob 
Miller Middle School.  The court’s order lacked any findings; in fact, the court found that attending 
both schools would be in the child’s best interest.  But, the court decided on Bob Miller Middle 
School because it took Melissa’s religious objection into consideration.  Matthew appealed the 
district court’s decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1  By Shannon Zahm 
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Discussion 
 
 When parents in a joint custody agreement disagree as to a child’s educational placement, 
the court must decide what is in the best interest of the child.2  The Nevada Supreme Court reviews 
“a district court’s best interest determination for a clear abuse of discretion.”3 
 The Court found that the district court abused its discretion in three ways: “(1) it disfavored 
religion in violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, (2) it failed to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing, and (3) it did not support its order with factual findings concerning R.A.’s 
best interest.”   
 
The district court abused its discretion by treating Melissa's religious objection as dispositive 
  
In determining what is in a child’s best interest, the district court must remain neutral in a 
situation that involves religion.4  A district court violates that principle of neutrality when it 
considers one parent’s religious objection as dispositive when deciding between a religious and 
nonreligious institution.5  Here, the Court concluded that the district court failed to act neutral 
towards religion.  The Court reasoned that the district court made no findings regarding R.A.’s 
best interest and appeared to treat Melissa’s objection as dispositive.   
Notably, the Court stated that the district court did not violate the First or the Fourteenth 
Amendments with its order, rather, it abused its discretion “by deferring to a parent’s religious 
objection instead of reviewing Matthew’s affidavits for adequate cause and then holding an 
evidentiary hearing to determine which school served the child's best interest.” 
 
The district court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing 
 
 If a moving party demonstrates “adequate cause,” a district court must hold an evidentiary 
hearing on a request to modify custodial orders.6  The moving party demonstrates “adequate cause” 
by presenting a prima facie case that the requested change is in the child’s best interest.7  Thus, to 
present a prima facie case, the moving party must demonstrate: “(1) the facts alleged in the 
affidavits are relevant to the [relief requested]; and (2) the evidence is not merely cumulative or 
impeaching.”8 
 Here, the Court found four facts that established adequate cause for an evidentiary hearing.  
Those facts include: R.A. was about to finish elementary school, the parents agreed R.A. should 
attend a different middle school, the parents disagreed as to which school, and Matthew’s affidavits 
provided facts relevant to that determination.  Therefore, the Court concluded that the district court 
                                                
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 125C.0045(1)(a) (authorizes courts to make orders regarding a child's 
education “as appears in his or her best interest”); see also Rivero v. Rivero, 216 P.3d 213, 221–
22 (Nev. 2009). 
3  Mack v. Ashlock, 921 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Nev. 1996). 
4  U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). 
5  Jordan v. Rea, 212 P.3d 919, 925 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). 
6  Rooney v. Rooney, 853 P.2d 123, 124 (Nev. 1993). 
7  Id. at 125. 
8  Id. 
 3 
abused its discretion by deciding solely based upon the pleadings and arguments of counsel.9  The 
circumstances required the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing, but the form of the hearing 
is within the district court’s discretion.10 
 
The district court failed to support its order with specific findings 
 
The Court must examine whether the district court’s custody determination tied in the 
child’s best interest through specific, relevant factual findings.11  Here, the Court noted that the 
district court’s only finding was that it was in R.A.’s best interest to attend both schools, which 
amounted to a “judicial shrug.”  Thus, the district court did not make any substantive findings 
regarding what was best for R.A. 
The Court provided guidance to the district court on factors to consider in determining 
which school is in R.A.’s best interest.  Some of the factors include: the wishes of the child, 
curriculum and method of teaching, the child’s extracurricular interests, the child’s past scholastic 
achievements, etc.12 These factors will guide the district court in making a substantive finding on 
the child’s best interest.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Reverse and remanded. The Court reversed the district court’s ruling and ordered the 
district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make specific factual finding to determine 
which school is best for R.A. to attend.  
                                                
9  See Mizrachi v. Mizrachi, 385 P.3d 982, 990 (Nev. Ct. App. 2016). 
10  See Sims v. Sims, 865 P.2d 328, 330 (Nev. 1993). 
11  Davis v. Ewalefo, 352 P.3d 1139, 1143 (Nev. 2015); Sims, 865 P.2d at 330. 
12  See, e.g., Jordan v. Rea, 212 P.3d 919, 925 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). 
